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ABSTRACT 
In an increasingly complex, mobile and interconnected world, we face growing threats of disasters, 
whether by chance or deliberately. Disruption of coordinated response and recovery efforts due to 
organizational, technical, procedural, random or deliberate attack could result in the risk of massive 
loss of life. This requires urgent action to explore the development of optimal information-sharing 
environments for promoting collective disaster response and preparedness using multijurisdictional 
hierarchical networks. Innovative approaches to information flow modeling and analysis for dealing 
with challenges of coordinating across multi layered agency structures as well as development of 
early warnings through social systems using social media analytics may be pivotal to timely 
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responses to dealing with large scale disasters where response strategies need to be viewed as a 
shared responsibility. How do facilitate the development of collective disaster response in a 
multijurisdictional setting? How do we develop and test the level and effectiveness of shared 
multijurisdictional hierarchical networks for improved preparedness and response? What is the role 
of multi layered training and exercises in building the shared learning space for collective disaster 
preparedness and response? The aim of this is therefore to determine factors that may be 
responsible for affecting disaster response. It is shown here that changes to the 
interconnectedness of nodes in the network may have implications on the potential to 
preparedness and response.  In this study, theory behind social network analysis is applied to a 
large-scale inter-organisational Disaster Response Network (DRN) for exploring correlation 
between network interconnectedness and response. We discover that the leadership and 
involvement displayed by organisations in multijurisdictional emergency response is not equal, 
and hypothesise the existence of a loose tiered structure that guides how interconnected an 
organisation should be. A model is presented as a theoretical means to confront the issues of 
disaster response. To test our hypotheses, we investigate survey data from state law enforcement, 
state emergency services and local law enforcement by performing agency-based (macro) and 
cross-agency (micro) analysis to identify attributes of each network and response. Results 
suggest that there is a positive correlation between network connectedness and potential to 
effective response as well as the concept of tiers within DRN may exist which can be 
characterized by the sub-network that an organisation associates with. 
Keywords: Disaster response, collective shared space, hierarchical networks 
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DISASTER RESPONSE NETWORK (DRN) 
The aim of the Disaster Response Network or DRN is to respond to extreme events as quickly 
and efficiently as possible in order to return society to a “business as usual” state, and thus 
restoring social confidence and economic stability (Waugh, 2003). Consequence Management 
can be triggered by a disaster serving as motivation for establishing DRN with the condition to 
save lives of the victims involved. Consequence management requires the mobilization of a 
complex network of organizations designed to be able to form rapidly to coordinate a 
multifaceted disaster response and then quickly dissolve once the incident has been controlled 
(Kapucu, 2003; Kapucu, 2005). The effectiveness of consequence management may be defined 
through quantifiable measures such as the number of lives lost, property damage, or perhaps 
overall time till recovery, which is referred as society’s “resilience” to extreme events, and are 
the gauge for assessing a society’s ability to cope (Wildawsky, 1971; cited in Kapucu, 2005).  
 
Van Scholten et al. (2005), Comfort and Kapucu (2003) and Waugh (2003) study on the state of 
American DRN identified several existing flaws that require further development for effective 
disaster relief and response. The specific challenges of DRN spur from the networks need for 
cooperation and coordination within the complex network of interdependent organizations. Van 
Scholten et al. (2005) describe common horizontal cooperation issues such as police, fire and 
medical crews having problems when interaction is necessary in the face of responding to 
interdependent tasks that are outside the scope of any one organization, especially when 
coordination is necessary in the face of a highly stressful and turbulent environment such as a 
disaster. Waugh (2006) further suggests that cooperation flaws are also apparent within the 
communication and coordination of organizational actors across vertical levels of leadership, 
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such as federal government agencies working with nonprofit organizations. The ability to 
coordinate between sectors such as with unaffiliated volunteers can potentially create a 
significant challenge and put strain on the coordination of the network. This is supported by 
literature revealing that some organizational actors within the network are reluctant to rely on 
other sectors in times of disaster and crisis (Kapucu, 2005). Moreover, it is especially directed 
towards nonprofit agencies, which according to Waugh (2006; cited in Kapucu, 2005), maintains 
an assertion from other sectors as being poorly skilled, lacking resources, and having the 
potential to inhibit the response by placing themselves in danger or obstructing professionals in 
the response effort.  
 
The ability for DRN to preserve sufficient information flow in the network rests in its ability to 
maintain a structured and stable distributed network where all avenues of communication remain 
open. Kapucu’s (2005) study into the 9/11 documents the challenges of such tasks when faced 
with a disaster event of significant magnitude. The problems associated with maintaining 
information flow produced a direct effect on the ability for leading organizations in the network 
to make informed decisions based on whole information, and other organizations to work 
together to carry out the directions (Van Scholten et al., 2005). Van Scholten et al. (2005) argue 
that decisions must be made in extreme events regardless of circumstance, and results of an 
impaired communication network has the ability for poor decisions to be made because of 
incomplete or even wrong information,. This, moreover, could have a significant impact on the 
efficiency of a response effort.  
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The lessons learned from current literature identifies the need for communication across vertical 
sector-based boundaries and horizontal same-sector organizations to minimize the prevalent 
coordination gap apparent within the current workings of DRNs (Van Scholten et al., 2005; 
Kapucu, 2005; Kettl, 2006). Studies into the events of Hurricane Katrina and September 11 
illustrate that under both naturally occurring and man-made disasters, the establishment of DRN 
alone (Stanley, 2006; Kapucu, 2005) is insufficient to create a resilient society to overcome 
extreme disaster events in a timely and efficient manner, but it is the development of 
coordination within the network that facilitates this process. The network structures outlined in 
the FRP (see Figure 2. Kapucu, 2005; Department of Homeland Security, 2006) illustrates that in 
the event of a crisis, the emergency agencies involved in consequence management are to 
quickly unite and form a distributed network where all agencies are central to the flow of 
information and are to coordinate themselves to respond to any interconnected set of problems 
that may present itself from the situation. The reality of this plan, however, was unable to 
reproduce the sophisticated, yet simplistic network as intended. The research conducted by 
Kapucu (2005) looked at the situation reports of the September 11 crisis, which represents an 
‘actual’ network as it stood during the event (Figure 1, Kapucu, 2005). The network graph 
displays a contrast between the planned and the actual network with a significant lack of 
interconnectedness and communication flowing between agencies. Granovetter (1983) suggests 
the implications of a reduced number of connections (or network ties) can potentially lead to a 
reduction in coordination due to actor segregation which limits the flow of information. This is 
especially important in DRN to create a sense of community and share knowledge in order to 
overcome problems that require an interdependent multi-agency response. Kapucu’s (2005) 
study into DRNs uses an exploratory model to assess interconnectedness of organizational actors 
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within a network during a crisis. The ability of Kapucu (2005) to look at actual rather than 
perceived data and interpret how the network functions during an actual incident is very useful 
for investigating how planned actions present themselves in live situations. The limitation of 
Kapucu’s (2005) study, however, is that it does not allow for an assessment of coordination 
within the network as an outcome of interconnectedness derived from network planning and 
optimization. It imposes challenges in judging the success of an organization in performing its 
role in the network during a crisis.  
 
Figure 1. Graphical Representation of Organization Network – FEMA Situation (in Kapucu, 2005) 
 
MODEL FOR DISASTER RESPONSE NETWORK 
The model is constructed with a view to assess the current state of preparedness and response as 
a product of the attributes of the network. The framework for the model is intended for DRN 
assessment during a non-crisis period in order to optimize network performance by creating a 
heightened state of preparedness. The model may be applicable to other networks that is 
distributed in nature and requires response to produce better performance. The model, as 
illustrated in Figure 2, depicts a framework for investigating disaster preparedness based on 
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network connectedness (evaluated through social network analysis). There is a single moderating 
variable defined as “Tiered Organization” which places an organization in one of three DRN 
tiers, which then forms the basis for assessing whether the resulting level of network 
involvement and thus potential to coordinate the network is adequate for a given agency. The 
connectedness of an agency within the network is measured by the three independent social 
networking variables which together produce an organizational actor’s assessment of network 
involvement. The three dependent variables define the characteristics of an organization’s 
current state of coordination and coordination potential in an emergency. The aim of applying 
the framework to DRNs is to empirically investigate the relationship between the network itself 
and the potential for response. The driving theory for constructing the model is based on the 
view that enhancing network performance correlates to increasing the capacity for coordination 
to occur. As a result of increasing network performance, the implied coordination gap present in 
emergency networks (Kapucu, 2005; Waugh, 2006; Kettl, 2006; Rathnam et al., 1995) may be 
reduced.  
Figure 2. A Model for Assessing Disaster Preparedness and Response Networks 
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An organization in the model represents any agency for any business sector that is somehow 
involved in the disaster network, in which each and every organization within DRN can be 
assessed to determine their current state of preparedness and therefore, required to alter their 
network connectedness level based on where they should be operating. A clique analysis defined 
as a sub-set of actors within a network that are more closely tied to create a subgroup is then 
carried out to assign tier allocation (Hanneman et al., 2005), which assist in assessing the cluster 
an organization belongs to. According to the National Response Planning or NRP (Department 
of Homeland Security, 2006) each agency involved in consequence management is responsible 
for taking on certain leadership roles within the DRN. The NRP implies a loosely based 
leadership structure that is assumed to represent three tiers of responsibilities whereby federal 
organizations represent the first tier, followed by state and local agencies, and then all other 
sectors and organizations. The clique analysis of an organization is hypothesized to provide 
evidence of tier placement based on an actor’s subgroup association. The reasoning behind this 
theory is that if an organization communicates with significantly more state and local authorities, 
it is likely that the agency being assessed also belongs to that particular tier. This leads to the 
first hypothesis that: 
 
(H1) – A prediction of what tier an organization belongs to can be made by analyzing an 
organization for its subgroup.  
 
A tier level determines an organization’s expected level of network connectedness. We use tiered 
organization as moderating variable in this study. A tiered organization represents an agency that 
has been placed in a particular tier group that determines its expected level of network 
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involvement. Based on the literature from the NRP (Department of Homeland Security, 2006) an 
association with a particular tier retains expectations of network leadership and coordination 
facilitation. By this reasoning, an assessment of preparedness is imbalanced across all 
organizations as performance expectations are not equal and therefore, a weighted score based on 
tier positioning is required. This leads to the second hypothesis that:  
 
 (H2) The level of network involvement expected from an organization is mediated by the tier 
they fall into.  
 
We then use network connectedness as an independent variable in our model. A degree centrality 
analysis is carried out to determine aspects of an ego’s network. Degree as an independent 
variable is used to measure connectedness, in which we defined the number of relationships (also 
known as arcs or ties) that a particular node (actor) is connected to. Marsden (2002) mentioned 
that the identical degree centrality measure may be used for an egocentric analysis as the 
principal for defining relationships remains the same. EgoBetweenness analysis is then carried 
out to determine aspects of an ego’s network, in which the measure of betweenness characterizes 
the extent to which a node lies in between other nodes in the network, or the extent to which a 
node falls on the shortest path between pairs of other nodes (Chung, Hossain and Davis, 2005; 
Freeman, 1977). Lastly, a tie strength analysis is carried out to determine aspects of an ego’s 
network. 
 
An analysis of readiness is carried out to determine aspects of an actor’s current state of 
coordination. We use readiness as dependent variable in our study, which defines readiness as an 
  10 
organization’s perceived ability to react to a crisis event should the need arise at any given 
moment. The variable is based on the literature by Kapucu (2005) where research is presented 
providing evidence that simple planning does not amount to a state of readiness when the 
emergency need arises. Waugh (2006) and Kettl’s (2006) account of the Emergency Response 
Network (ERN) in hindsight of emergency disasters generate discussion on particular agencies’ 
roles and the need for a faster response in order to create resilience. This concept has been 
recognized and characterized here as actors readiness.  
 
An analysis of the quality of information received is carried out to determine aspects of an 
actor’s current state of coordination. In our framework, we define quality (dependent variable) in 
terms of the quality of information that is received by the agency under assessment in order to 
examine what coordination benefits they can provide. Scholten et al. (2005) mention the 
coordination benefits of improved quality of information disseminating through the network as 
an improved ability for collaboration and decision-making strategies. We further perform an 
analysis of the accessibility (dependent variable) of information. This is carried out to determine 
aspects of an actor’s current state of coordination. Accessibility of information refers to an 
organization’s capacity to retrieve information from a multitude of sources. The importance of 
being granted access to information in DRN is that regardless of information, decisions must be 
made about how the network will be coordinated to respond to a crisis. By having access to 
different sources, organizations are able to group disparate pieces of information to develop a 
more whole understanding of the problem and be in a more informed position to make urgent 
decisions (Scholten et al., 2005). By investigating the three measures of social networking theory 
that combine to represent an organizational assessment of network connectedness, it is theorized 
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that the involvement of an organization in the DRN has significant implications on the 
coordination performance it is able to achieve. The hypothesis proposed as a result of this 
concept is that: 
 
(H3) There is a significant relationship between network involvement and coordination where an 
increase in network connectedness produces an increase in organizational coordination within a 
given threshold.  
 
DISASTER RESPONSE NETWORK DATASET 
The dataset entitled “Domestic Terrorism: Assessment of State and Local Preparedness in the 
United States, 1992” was found at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research (ICPSR) website: (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/06566.xml, 
last accessed on 15 April 2008. The study was developed with the purpose to “analyze states' and 
municipalities' terrorism preparedness as a means of providing law enforcement with information 
about the prevention and control of terrorist activities in the United States” (Riley and Hoffman, 
1995). The study was funded by the United States Department of Justice and the National 
Institute of Justice. Research investigation was carried out by Kevin Jack Riley and Bruce 
Hoffman of the RAND Corporation. The research agenda was to conduct an assessment of how 
state and local law enforcement perceived the threat of terrorism under the federal level of 
government. The framework for data collection involved sending each selected agency a 
package, which included the survey instrument, a request letter of participation, a confidentiality 
agreement, and a brief overview of the RAND Corporation (Riley and Hoffman, 1995). The 
procedure after the initial invitation was to follow up with a second letter after a ten day period 
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as a reminder notice. Should the study not be filled in within three weeks, another package 
containing all documents found in the original invitation were resent, and was subsequently 
followed two weeks later by a phone call to the agencies who had not yet responded. It is noted 
that if the survey still was not filled in and returned twenty days after the final telephone call, 
another jurisdiction would be contacted to replace the non-respondent agency. 
 
The sampling technique used to invite participants involved a two-part methodology for local 
law enforcement agencies. The first stage of sampling required the selection of twelve counties 
in each census district using a population-based method. Three counties were selected based on 
the 1990 U.S Census estimates that they were the largest counties in different states, and the 
remainder were chosen by random sample from each region pool that qualified in the categories 
of population exceeding 500,000; between 100,000 and 500,000; and less than 100,000. An 
additional 139 locations were also included in the second stage to supplement the sample, which 
were selected based on targeted-sampling in districts that had experienced or retained targets 
likely to provoke terrorist activity. It is also mentioned that no sampling methodology was used 
in selecting state law enforcement and emergency agencies (Riley and Hoffman, 1995). The 
response rate for the study includes 39 state law enforcement agencies, 37 state emergency 
agencies, and 148 local law enforcement agencies (see Table 1 below). It is important to note 
that the study was begun in 1992 and completed in January 1993, one month before the 1994 
World Trade Centre bombing. The significance of the timeliness of the study present evidence 
that the responses given in the survey were provided in a non-crisis state and therefore applicable 
to preparedness perceptions rather than lessons learned in hindsight. Any events of the terrorist 
bombing would therefore not be represented in the answers given. 
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Table 1. Response Rate of Research Sample 
Response Table             
         
Agency Group   
No. Agencies 
Invited   
No. agencies 
Participated   
Response 
Rate % 
State Law Enforcement   52  39  73% 
State Emergency   52  37  71% 
Local Law Enforcement   299  148  49% 
Local Law Enforcement (population-
based) 160  84  53% 
Local Law Enforcement (targeted-sample) 139  64  46% 
          
              
  
The first stage of preparing the data required a thorough exploration of the survey instrument to 
identify possible questions that provided relational data to assess the respondent’s social 
network, or questions relevant to an analysis of the current perceptions of their coordination 
abilities. In searching for networking data, two questions were found providing information on 
the respondent’s perceived interaction with other agencies (Figure 3 and 4 below). These two 
questions were combined to form the respondent’s ego-centric network, which was used to 
analyze the social networking measures of egobetweenness and the degree of agency 
interconnectedness, as well as the respondents’ sub-group structure based on a clique analysis. 
 
 
 
Further investigation of the survey instrument presented the final measure for network 
connectedness as tie strength by ranking the frequency of contact between the respondent’s 
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agency and others of a particular group such as municipal or state agencies (see Figure 5 below). 
These questions were combined to give a single representation of tie strength. Figure 6 below 
Relational Frequency of contact question representing tie strength, study by Riley and Hoffman 
(1995). 
 
 
 
Exploration for coordination-based questions revealed a single item applicable for two 
independent measures of coordination (see figure 7). They are represented as accessibility of 
information, which is defined in this question by the number of sources used, and quality which 
is defined as a rank of usefulness from the sources used. The final measure of coordination, 
defined as readiness was extracted from a question which asked the respondent how prepared 
they perceive their agency to be to respond to an incident such as a terrorist disaster event (see 
figure 8 below).  
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An examination of the Degree, EgoBetweeness and Tie Strength measures using SPSS reveals 
common distributions of all three that follow a non-normal curve. Each graph consists of 
centralized scores with a tapered skew to the right. This distribution is set against a line to 
illustrate the scores needed to represent a bell-curve. As a result of the non-normal distribution, 
non-parametric statistical testing must be carried out. The model uses the Kruskal-Wallis test to 
compare the mean ranks of the interconnectedness scores. This test is a non-parametric substitute 
for a one-way ANOVA comparison. The other test used in the model is correlations, which is 
examined by means of a Spearman Rank Order Correlation. The Spearman test is a non-
parametric alternative to the Pearson test, which investigates the relationship between two 
continuous scores. We use the Spearman test rather than a Chi-square analysis because all of the 
variables being explored are created as continuous and as such require tests involving two or 
more continuous variables. By placing the variables into SPSS, we are able to perform some 
statistical analyses for hypothesis testing as defined in our DRN model (see Table 2 below). 
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Table 2. SPSS Test Matrix Defining Tests to Be Carried Out and Which Variables to Be Used 
SPSS Test 
Matrix             
          
    Degree EgoBetweenness Tie Strength Quality Accessibility Readiness 
Degree 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
Comparison x x x x x 
EgoBetweenness x 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Comparison x x x x 
Tie Strength x x 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Comparison x x x 
Quality 
Spearman 
Correlation 
Spearman 
Correlation 
Spearman 
Correlation x x x 
Accessibility 
Spearman 
Correlation 
Spearman 
Correlation 
Spearman 
Correlation x x x 
Readiness 
Spearman 
Correlation 
Spearman 
Correlation 
Spearman 
Correlation x x x 
          
Note: x denotes unnecessary or out of scope testing         
 
A key point to note about the study by Riley and Hoffman (1992) is that the data collection 
method was by means of a survey instrument. Sinclair (1995) notes that survey’s, along with any 
sort of questionnaire or interview methodology for gathering data is described as being 
subjective. Blyth (1972) defines subjective data as retaining personal beliefs and incorporating 
pre-judgments rather than simply providing impartial facts. The relational data collected for 
social networking analysis is a subjective perception of the respondent’s emergency contacts as it 
requires the respondent to remember, circle and list all actors with whom he/she exchanges 
within the DRN. In contrast to this, the study by Naim Kapucu (2005) on the DRN during the 
September 11 Terrorist disaster is an account of the actual network as it existed during the crisis. 
Kapucu’s (2005) study looks at the situation reports of the event as collected by FEMA. This 
data collection methodology retains objective measures as according to McClelland (1995), 
objective data may be a direct record registered by an independent observer in the form of video, 
audio or, in this case, text. The composition of the questions pertinent to coordination in Riley 
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and Hoffman’s (1995) study are devised of rank and ratings scales, both of which are mentioned 
by Sinclair (1995) as common subjective data collection methods and therefore open to the same 
discrimination as the relational questions. Blyth (1972) states that the most important aspect to 
remember when studying subjective data is that although it is useful to analyze for a given 
perspective, a major disadvantage is that the beliefs or perception of the respondent may be 
wrong or only partially inclusive or accurate. It is assumed that such is the case with the 
relational questions being analyzed and that the egocentric network only contains partial 
information on alters in respondents’ network.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
We first provide an overview of the high level organizational network from the data set. Second, 
we provide testing of our hypotheses at both a macro and micro level to explore interactions of 
actors and their organization in the context of responding to emergency situation. Lastly, we 
provide analysis which is statistically significant to validate and justify the relationship between 
coordination and social network by testing our DRN model and the hypotheses developed within. 
The high level representation (Figure 9) illustrates the organizations involved in DRN from an 
ego perspective.  
Figure 9. Macro-level Representation of the State and Local Agency Ego Networks 
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We first explore the network from a macro level to determine if any organizations naturally work 
together and form closer relationships. This clustering of agencies is supported through the 
identification and cooperation of individual actors representing their respective agencies at a 
micro-level. After examining inter-agency integration, the concept of tier mediation over 
network involvement is investigated. We first look at this notion at a macro-level by comparing 
agency networks, and then study this idea more closely at the micro-level by comparing clusters. 
A final examination of the relationship between network measures is assessed against 
coordination to determine if a correlation exists. A general hypothesis of correlation is 
investigated and therefore this is analyzed at the macro-level. To provide evidence that the same 
concept can be applied at any level of the network, the micro-level clusters are also examined for 
correlations between interconnectedness and coordination. The purpose of this section is to 
provide evidence to support the DRN to generate discussion and further investigation of the 
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model with agencies from different business sectors in an effort to increase coordination 
preparedness by optimizing DRN conditions. The network visualization below (see Figure 10) 
illustrates the combined respondent data from all three agencies into one egocentric network. At 
first glance the network shows a similar level of centrality between all three organizational 
actors, which implies that all three organizations may have a similar level of network 
involvement.  
 
Figure 10. Micro-level representation of the combined state law, state emergency and local law 
enforcement networks 
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It has previously been discussed that although DRN follow a distributed approach to responding 
to extreme disaster events, there exists a need for organizational leadership based on a control or 
executive order structure, which is defined in the DRN model as tiers (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2006; Kettl, 2006). The National Response Plan (Department of Homeland Security, 
2006) documents decision-making roles and responsibilities and control of the network based on 
this loose leadership hierarchy (see Figure 11, Department of Homeland Security, 2006 for 
evidence of this hierarchy). Although the NRP does not clearly state how many tiers this 
structure has, or a definitive flow of leadership, it does provide some evidence to suggest that 
once a “Presidential disaster or emergency declaration” has been made, the first-order 
coordination responsibilities falls to federal government agencies such as FEMA. The plan 
implies that government agencies other than at federal level share an interdependent role under 
federal leadership to then guide organizations from other sector. This structure, insinuated in the 
response plan frameworks developed by the Department of Homeland Security (Figure 11), leads 
to the theory of a 3-tiered control approach to emergency coordination within the distributed 
network. 
 
Figure 11. Evidence of hierarchical leadership and coordination in emergency response, 
Department of Homeland Security, 2006 
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As evidence to suggest that local and state government agencies share the 2nd tier of network 
control, a hypothesis is put forward which states: 
 
(H1) – A prediction of what tier an organization belongs to can be made by analyzing an 
organization for its subgroup.  
 
Organizational Clique Analysis 
A clique analysis of Figure 10 above reveals that there are 15 cliques (see Table 3 and Table 4 
below) within the perceived ego network of the three groups, all of which contain state and local 
agencies, and some of which include federal agencies. This overlap with some federal agencies is 
natural in an emergency response network as organizations need to exchange information and 
resources to coordinate through the distributed structure. This analysis suggests that local and 
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state agencies do in fact share a common level of involvement within the DRN For a more 
definitive confirmation of this finding, however, an analysis of agencies in other tiers would need 
to be tested. 
 
Table 3. Clique analysis output of respondents from state and local agencies 
 
 
Table 4. Clique co-membership matrix to determine sub-groupings 
 
 
By examining the combined state law, state emergency and local law enforcement networks at a 
micro level (see Figure 10), we can explore the clustering of individual actors to provide further 
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evidence to support the first hypothesis that actors from within the three agency groups are 
interconnected and share responsibilities for driving the DRN. 
 
Organizational n-Clique Analysis (Micro level) 
Performing an n-clique analysis on the low-level network allows us to dissect the network and 
investigate network behaviour at a micro-level. This discrete perspective uncovers 249 clusters 
or sub-grouping within the greater network; closer inspection of the sub-groups reveals actors 
from each of the three agencies within a distance of length of 2 from each other. It is noted that 
there is an overlap with agencies between clusters, however for the purpose of this investigation, 
identification of clusters containing actors from both state and local agencies is sufficient 
evidence to support the hypothesis. 
 
An assessment of three clusters selected at random from the n-clique analysis allows us to further 
investigate our DRN model and examine the behaviour of cross-sections of the DRN to support 
the stated hypotheses. The three diagrams of each of the clusters (see Figures 12, 13 and 14 
below) provide a visual representation of the sub-groups under investigation. Note that within the 
sub-groups, only organizations from state law, state emergency and local law enforcement 
agencies are investigated. The graphs illustrate other agencies in pink that are identified to be 
within the clusters, however only the nodes in yellow, blue, and orange, respectively, will be 
assessed in the DRN model and compared. At face-value, it is evident that organizations from 
each of the three agencies work closely within the model as depicted in Figures 12, 13, and 14.  
 
Figure 12. Illustrates the first randomly selected cluster from the n-clique analysis 
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Figure 13. Illustrates the second randomly selected cluster from the n-clique analysis 
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Figure 14. Illustrates the third randomly selected cluster from the n-clique analysis 
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If we accept the test results above and assume that a clique analysis of an organization allows for 
tier definition, we can then test the second hypothesis that: 
  
(H2) The level of network involvement expected from an organization is mediated by the tier they 
fall into.  
 
Based on the clique results that state and local agencies share a common tier, we can perform a 
simple comparison to assess whether or not each second tier organizations share similar network 
connectedness as defined by an analysis of degree, EgoBetweenness and tie strength. The 
graphical data below illustrates the egocentric network of each of the three organizational actors’ 
and how each individual respondent in that organization perceives their network (see Figures 15, 
16, 17 below). Ultimately testing this hypothesis would need to be carried out with actual rather 
than perceived network data and involve studies of agencies from other tiers to decipher an 
accurate assessment of whether tier placement (which implies subgroup belonging) is a factor in 
how connected an organization is. At this point, however, data restrictions permit only a state 
and local assessment of the perceived network of the fore-mentioned government agencies. 
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Figure 15. State Law Enforcement Network 
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Figure 16. State Emergency Services network 
 
Figure 17. Local Law Enforcement network 
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Organizational comparison to determine tier placement and interconnectedness 
A Kruskal-Wallis test of the mean rank of each of the three interconnectedness measures shows a 
significant difference in scores between state law enforcement, state emergency services, and 
local law enforcement for degree and EgoBetweenness (Table 5 below). Mean rank scores of tie 
strength show no significant difference implying each agency maintains a similar range of weak 
and strong ties to organizations within the network. 
Table 5. Kruskal-Wallis Interconnectedness Comparison of Mean Ranks 
 
Kruskal-Wallis comparison of mean rank     
       
    Degree EgoBetweenness Tie Strength 
        
State Law Enforcement   61.74 127.26 61.67 
State Emergency Services 73.45 154.92 52.57 
Local Law Enforcement   51.15 99.63 58.12 
        
Asymp. Sig.   0.00** 0.01** 0.476 
       
Note. Significant difference in rank mean at the 0.01 level are denoted **.   
          Significant difference in rank mean at the 0.05 level are denoted *.   
 
By comparing the mean rank of state law enforcement agencies to state emergency services, a 
difference of 27.66 is produced under EgoBetweenness, and 11.71 for degree. This difference in 
scores is assumed to be an acceptable margin considering the NRP (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2006) identifies all state-based organizations as indifferent from each other and sharing 
common leadership responsibilities and connections within the DRN. When the mean rank of 
state and local law enforcement is compared for degree and EgoBetweenness, results indicate 
that local law enforcement is within the same margin to state law enforcement as state law is to 
state emergency. This suggests that although local law enforcement is somewhat less 
interconnected than state law and emergency services, it is still within the range of the two state 
agencies, and therefore possible to be includedin the same tier. The mean scores of tie strength 
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produce no significant difference which suggests a similar network of weak and strong ties exist 
for each of the three agencies. This may be due to the tier structure as organizations within a 
specific subgroup would be likely to associate with the same agencies and seek information from 
similar contacts. Projection as to why there is a significant difference between scores of local law 
enforcement, state emergency services, and state law enforcement may be a consequence of task-
based responsibilities. Each agency, although from the same tier still maintain specific functions 
unique to their organization within the network. For instance, local agencies such as law 
enforcement, fire and ambulance services perform hands-on tasks at ground zero, while state 
agencies provide more assistance and resource coordination. This requires an interdependency of 
government agencies at state and local level to provide leadership under the federal government 
for the DRN as a whole.  
 
Cluster comparison to determine tier placement and interconnectedness   
A Kruskal-Wallis test on each of the three clusters against the interconnectedness measures of 
Degree, EgoBetweenness and Tie Strength reveal no significant difference in scores (Table 6 
below). 
Kruskal-Wallis comparison of mean rank     
       
    Degree EgoBetweenness Tie Strength 
        
Cluster 1   99.50 99.29 87.78 
Cluster 2 106.00 108.54 94.21 
Cluster 3   88.52 87.10 100.65 
        
Asymp. Sig.   0.152 0.064 0.435 
       
Note. Significant difference in rank mean at the 0.01 level are denoted **.   
          Significant difference in rank mean at the 0.05 level are denoted *.   
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The three clusters of state and local government agencies taken from the DRN, indicate that the 
level of connectedness between all three groups are comparable. The marginal differences in 
scores may suggest further evidence to the idea that although they are not significantly different, 
there is in fact a difference that may account for a threshold of network involvement allowing for 
an amount of variance between agencies or in this case clusters taken from the same tier. The 
fact that all three clusters, selected from what is believed to be the second tier, retain similar 
scores in the Kruskal-Wallis comparison is evidence suggesting that tier placement is a primary 
candidate for determining the level of network involvement. Although both of these tests are not 
definitive proof that an organization’s interconnectedness is mediated by their tier level, it does 
in fact provide a step in the right direction by beginning to explore the possible thresholds within 
a given tier of what constitutes adequate network involvement and interconnectedness. It is only 
through an understanding of this threshold for each of the three tiers that an analysis can be 
carried out to clearly define whether interconnectedness is in fact mediated by the tier structure. 
Further analysis of clusters in different tier allocations would also be beneficial to support this 
hypothesis. Once an organizational analysis has been made to determine tier placement, it is 
proposed that a significant proportion of constitutes the effectiveness of coordination in DRN is 
the result of how involved an organization is within a network. This level of coordination based 
on network interconnection is arguably then a determining factor in what distinguishes an 
organization’s state of preparedness. By using social networking theory to assess network 
involvement, the hypothesis put forward is that: 
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 (H3) There is a significant relationship between network involvement and coordination 
where an increase in network connectedness produces an increase in organizational 
coordination within a given threshold.  
 
This hypothesis is investigated by looking at the sub-hypotheses of social network measures 
correlating to measures of coordination in order to ascertain the overarching statement. The tests 
aim to provide evidence of a positive relationship between the two variables; literature, however, 
states that by being too involved in a network, too much information exchange can have a 
negative effect on coordination and efficiency (Kapucu, 2005; Scholten et al. 2005). This section 
of the hypothesis is for further investigation due to a lack of data for testing a threshold; however 
it is important to recognize the literature stating that a threshold exists, and excessive 
connectedness under the premise of network involvement as an enabler for coordination can be 
turned into an inhibitor.  
 
Connectedness correlates to increased coordination 
A Spearman test is used to determine if there is a relationship between the continuous 
independent connectedness variables of degree, EgoBetweenness and tie strength with the 
continuous dependent coordination variables of readiness, quality and accessibility (see Table 7 
below). This test combines the agency data of all three networks to provide a general 
examination of the social networking measures against coordination measures.  
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Table 7. Spearman correlations matrix between connectedness and coordination 
Spearman correlations matrix (Combined agency 
network  data)       
          
    Degree EgoBetweenness 
Tie 
Strength Readiness Quality Accessibility 
Degree  1       
EgoBetweenness  x 1      
Tie Strength  x x 1     
Readiness  0.263** 0.252** 0.221** 1    
Quality  0.231** 0.216** 0.281** x 1   
Accessibility   0.321** 0.312** 0.349** x x 1 
          
Note.  Correlations significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) are 
denoted **.      
          Correlations significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) are 
denoted *.     
          'x' signifies correlations not tested         
 
Increased Degree Centrality correlates to: 
• (H3a) increased Coordination Readiness 
• (H3b) increased Quality of Information 
• (H3c) increased Information Accessibility 
 
The results of the Spearman test indicate a positive correlation coefficient between degree and 
each of the three dependent coordination variables where an increase in the measure of degree 
produces an increase in readiness, information quality and accessibility; the tests all show 
significance at the 0.01 level. A positive increase to an organization’s readiness for an 
emergency and ability to be granted access to information that is also of a higher standard has 
shown to be, in part, a product of increasing the number of emergency contacts an organization 
maintains. This finding may arguably be a result of the nature of a distributed network structure. 
Kapucu (2005) states that not all organizations are central in DRN and can have effects on 
information transfer as it disseminates through the network. By increasing the number of 
contacts a given organization maintains, the network is able to become more connected and 
distributed as a whole, which can potentially enable better flow of information to reduce the 
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coordination gap. From an individual organization’s perspective this robustness created through 
increasing each organizational node’s contacts producing a better connected network which may 
be the motivation for the improvement to aspects of coordination such as quality and 
accessibility of information, and how ready an organization is to respond in a crisis.  
 
Increased EgoBetweenness correlates to: 
• (H3d) increased Coordination Readiness 
• (H3e) increased Quality of Information 
• (H3f) increased Information Accessibility 
 
The relationship between the three dependent coordination variables against EgoBetweenness 
produces a positive correlation coefficient to the 0.01 significance level. The Spearman test 
denotes an increase in each of the measures of coordination including readiness, quality and 
accessibility of information based on an increase in EgoBetweenness. The results of these tests 
provide evidence that an increase in an organizations ability to be in a controlling position within 
the DRN improves an organization’s capacity to coordinate in an emergency. Potentially by 
being more central in the network and maintaining the capability to impede or enhance the flow 
of information, an organization may find itself in a more empowering position which dictates 
how accessible information is to come across, the quality of that information, and an overall 
readiness to coordinate with other nodes. Malone and Crowston (1994) state that the 
synchronization of information for coordination efficiency is of significant importance, by 
improving EgoBetweenness which has implications on network positioning and control 
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(Freeman, 1979), an organization is able to be in a more dominant state to receive information 
and coordinate others.  
 
Increased Tie Strength correlates to: 
• (H3g) increased Coordination Readiness 
• (H3h) increased Quality of Information 
• (H3i) increased Information Accessibility 
 
The Spearman correlation indicates that an increase in tie strength produces an increase in the 
quality of information, accessibility of information, and how ready an organization is to 
coordinate in an emergency; the results are significant to the 0.01 level. 
 
An egocentric analysis of tie strength against coordination finds that an increase in the quality of 
relationships is able to improve coordination attributes such as quality and accessibility of 
information, and overall readiness for an emergency situation. Speculation as to why such a 
correlation exists may be due to the context of the data itself more than an overarching statement 
of tie strength. The study by Riley and Hoffman (1996) devises the question on tie strengths 
based on existing ties from local, state and federal departments. Under the framework of the 
original research study, it may be said that when organizations in an emergency network invest 
in existing relationships to strengthen the bond, interorganizational dependency becomes more 
efficient as trust is developed and collective sense making can be enhanced. This in turn may 
mean that after establishing better network relationships, an organization is more likely to have 
access to information that is of better quality due to other organizations being more forthcoming. 
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This improved working relationship may then be able to have positive affect on sharing which 
may facilitate coordination and perceived state of readiness to interact with other organizational 
nodes on an emergency.  
 
Connectedness correlates to increased coordination 
A subsequent examination for correlation is carried out to provide supporting evidence of the 
relationship between network connectedness and the potential for coordination. The three 
randomly selected clusters are merged to provide enough cases to perform a Spearman 
correlation and determine if the correlation that has been identified to exist at the macro-level of 
the DRN holds at the micro-level (see Table 8 below).  
 
Spearman correlations matrix (combined cluster network 
data) 
        
    Degree EgoBetweenness 
Tie 
Strength Readiness Quality Accessibility 
Degree  1       
EgoBetweenness  x 1      
Tie Strength  x x 1     
Readiness  0.112 0.100 0.220 1    
Quality  0.292** 0.264** 0.219** x 1   
Accessibility   0.226** 0.172* 0.385** x x 1 
          
Note. Correlations significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) are 
denoted **.      
          Correlations significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) are 
denoted *.     
          'x' signifies correlations not tested         
 
As discovered in the previous test, the cluster examination reveals a positive correlation between 
the coordination measures of quality and accessibility against the network interconnectedness 
  
  37 
measures of degree, EgoBetweenness and tie strength. This evidence supports the hypotheses 
that: 
 
• (H3b) Increased Degree correlates to increased Information Accessibility 
• (H3c) Increased Degree correlates to increased Quality of Information 
• (H3e) Increased EgoBetweenness correlates to increased Information Accessibility 
• (H3f) Increased EgoBetweenness correlates to increased Quality of Information 
• (H3h) Increased Tie Strength correlates to increased Information Accessibility 
• (H3i) Increased Tie Strength correlates to increased Quality of Information 
 
The results for coordination readiness investigated at the micro-level reveal a difference in 
findings from the macro-level test. The data suggests a positive correlation between each of the 
three network connectedness measures to coordination readiness, however none of which were 
particularly significant. Speculation as to why this may have occurred may be a result of the 
clusters selected for analysis. Since there is evidence to suggest the interconnectedness scores of 
each cluster is not significantly different from each other as discovered while testing the second 
hypothesis, it is plausible that because of the macro-level correlation between interconnectedness 
and coordination readiness, all three clusters each provided similar subjective scores of readiness 
which as a result provided an insufficient range of readiness scores to calculate a correlation. To 
support this possible theory, a Kruskal-Wallis test is performed to determine if there is a 
significant difference between clusters. The results indicate that each of the three clusters are in 
very close proximity and therefore supports why no correlation was found between coordination 
readiness and interconnectedness at the micro-level (Table 9). 
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Table 9. Kruskal-Wallis comparison of readiness between clusters 
Kruskal-Wallis Comparison of Readiness 
     
    Readiness 
      
Cluster 1   99.52 
Cluster 2 95.70 
Cluster 3   94.64 
      
Asymp. Sig.   0.868 
     
Note. Significant difference in rank mean at the 0.01 level are denoted **. 
          Significant difference in rank mean at the 0.05 level are denoted *. 
 
The work by Kapucu (2005) regarding interorganizational connectedness taken from the 
situation reports of the September 11 disaster is important for understanding the coordination gap 
that exists between the current state of ERNs and where the NRP (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2006) requires the standard of an emergency response to be. Arguably, the more 
organized and coordinated an emergency network is to respond to extreme events, the more 
likely a society is to have greater resilience to any form of disaster. Comments by Scholten et al. 
(2005), Stanley (2006) and Kettl (2006) mention lessons learned in hindsight of recent natural 
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, and man-made disasters like the 2001 World Trade Center 
attacks focus on the need for better communication and coordination. It is stated that by having 
better coordination, the network can facilitate a more fluent exchange of information to enhance 
interorganizational collaboration (Scholten et al, 2005; Stanley, 2006; Kettl, 2006). Kapucu’s 
(2005) exploratory study of ERN in crisis events highlights a significant lack of network 
connectedness when the emergency network is called on for a real-life response effort. Kapucu’s 
(2005) evidence of structural holes in the network and weak points of communication, coupled 
with Scholten et al. (2005), Stanley (2006), and Kettl’s (2006) account of the problems of an 
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emergency response shows a coordination issue most probably brought about by a lack of 
network connectedness.  
 
CONCLUSION 
By presenting a model of coordination assessment based on network connectedness, an 
organization can be reviewed in order to find their current state of connectedness and therefore 
be judged for their potential to coordinate in an emergency. The findings from the hypothesis 
that (H1) a prediction of what tier an organization belongs to can be made by analyzing an 
organization for their subgroup, suggests that within DRN, organizations that share common 
traits form subgroups. These groupings then form the basis for an assumption that collective 
involvement from organizations that interact and share a common purpose within the DRN can 
be categorized into tiers which retain certain levels of authority and control over the network and 
the potential to coordinate in an emergency. The importance of this step in the DRN model is in 
making sure network connectedness acts as an enabler of coordination efficiency rather than an 
inhibitor by limiting network involvement to the needs of a given tier and thus preventing the 
circulation of redundant or unnecessary information through the network as a product of 
excessive ties. The influence for using a clique analysis for assessing organizations into tiers is 
based on the literature by Falzon (2000) where it is stated that, “in any human organization in 
which individuals interact…groups emerge quite naturally and often deliberately…it helps us 
understand how information spreads throughout the organization.”  
 
Although the data used for performing a clique analysis of an organization into tiers is somewhat 
limited due to the fixed list structure of the relational data questions in the study by Riley and 
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Hoffman (1996), and by only examining organizations from the same tier, the test itself was able 
to give insight on how the theory would be carried out on organizations from all different levels. 
The results from this test provide evidence of the usefulness of tier assignment by means of 
cliques; validation of this hypothesis would, however, need to be carried out on a wider 
emergency audience.   
 
The same data limitations present for the first hypothesis apply to the second hypothesis in that 
(H2) the level of network involvement expected from an organization is mediated by the tier they 
fall into. The results of the first hypothesis provide reasonable analysis to speculate that the 
organizations examined are derived from the same clique, and therefore represent a single tier in 
the DRN. The findings of the second hypothesis suggest a range of interconnectedness scores 
between these agencies which leads to the assumption that a threshold exists between 
organizations within the same tier. If this were in fact the case then it is reasonable to assume 
that since these agencies all retain network involvement scores within what is defined as the 
threshold of the second tier, then it is possible that tier allocation is a determining factor to the 
level of network involvement for a given organization.  
 
This threshold may provide a rough guide for organizations based on their tier assessment level 
of how connected they should be within the DRN and of how much leadership they should show. 
The usefulness of the test results may account for the spectrum of network control between 
which nodes in the second tier currently operate. However to validate this statement, further 
analysis would need to be carried out on organizations in other tiers in order to provide a suitable 
comparison.  
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The hypothesis that (H3) connectedness correlates to increased coordination is important for 
understanding how a coordination gap can be minimized by establishing a greater connected 
network. The findings suggest that in order to investigate coordination in a distributed network, it 
is important to look beyond the task (Mintzberg, 1979) or relationship alone (Coordination 
Theory Model, Malone and Crowston, 1994) and examine the network structure and its 
implications on a coordination outcome. The analysis provides evidence of this by presenting a 
significant correlation between the measures of network involvement and the ability of that 
network to coordinate amongst themselves. The usefulness of these results show how an 
organization’s perceived ability to coordinate is partially based on the fluency of the network 
itself. By combining these hypotheses, the model as a whole is able to assess how prepared an 
organization is to coordinate in an emergency based on how connected they are.  Table 10 below 
illustrates each hypothesis’s testing and the implications of each outcome on the model in order 
for coordination to occur within an ERN. 
 
Table 10. Coordination Implications of Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis Testing and Coordination 
Implications   
     
Test   Implications of finding 
T1a/b    clique analysis of ERN actors 
  
An actor’s subgroup represents tier 
placement. 
T2a/b   Kruskal-Wallis SNA comparison 
Actors from a single tier assert SNA scores 
within a threshold. 
T3a/b   Spearman correlation of 
  Network structure affects coordination  
             connectedness to coordination Efficiency. 
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The first hypothesis that subgroups help to delegate organizations into tiers is important to create 
horizontal and vertical network awareness and belonging to help organizations understand their 
role in an emergency response effort. The second hypothesis that an organization’s tier 
moderates their connectedness is a necessary step for making sure that it is not simply the 
creation of a more connected network, but of a more efficiently connected network, where ties 
only exist where they are needed and to optimize information flow through the right channels. 
The third hypothesis that connectedness correlates to coordination establishes that by making a 
network more connected, coordination is enabled to be enhanced.  
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